A popular MCP server (token-optimizer-mcp) has OS command injection: pass a crafted username to get-user-info, get shell on the agent host. Any API key in that process env is gone. This is why…

The 1Claw CLI now runs a local daemon and secret proxy. Your @elizaOS and @AnthropicAI agents request secrets over localhost, the daemon fetches scoped values from the vault, and nothing is ever…

No secrets in your CI config. Set ONECLAW_API_KEY once and the 1Claw CLI pulls scoped, short-lived secrets at build time for your @AnthropicAI and @langchain agents. No plaintext in pipeline logs or…

Wallet drained by an AI agent. Not phishing. Not malware. An agent with direct key access did it in seconds. If the agent holds credentials, it's the attack surface. Keys vault-side, every action…

1claw setup auto-detects Cursor, @AnthropicAI Claude Code, VS Code, Zed, and @coderhq workspaces and points each one at the 1Claw MCP server. Your AI editor reads secrets from the vault at runtime…

One command moves every secret out of your .env and into an HSM-backed vault: 1claw import .env. Your @AnthropicAI and @langchain agents then fetch them at runtime, so a leaked repo or stolen laptop…

Agent secret hygiene in one command just shipped. brew install, 1claw import .env, 1claw setup, and your keys move from plaintext on disk into an HSM-backed vault your tools pull from at runtime.…

Big 1Claw CLI update. Your AI agents and coding tools should not read API keys from a .env file. Run 1claw import .env, then 1claw setup, and @AnthropicAI Claude Code, Cursor, and @coderhq workspaces…